If you want to cheer for the C919, you must first get to know the Y-10

Before the C919

CNN provided a detailed report on the first commercial flight of the C919—the Chinese-made large passenger jet departed Shanghai at 10:32 AM Beijing time and landed at Beijing Capital International Airport around noon, passing through the "water gate," a symbol of the highest honor in civil aviation.

CNN noted that the C919 will become a direct competitor to the Airbus A320 and Boeing B737 narrow-body jets, which are frequently used on domestic and regional international routes.

The Wall Street Journal reported that the C919's maiden commercial flight signifies that Boeing and Airbus are facing challenges in the Chinese market. Although this challenge is currently small in scale, it holds symbolic significance. According to the BBC, COMAC's C919 is expected to break the dominance of Airbus and Boeing in the single-aisle jet aircraft market.

The UK's Financial Times believes that looking at the long-term development of the Chinese passenger aircraft industry, it may shake the "duopoly" position of Boeing and Airbus.

From the positive coverage by foreign media, it is evident that the C919's current momentum demonstrates very strong potential: it will have a huge market in the future!

On May 29, 2023, with a skeptical attitude toward the C919, I had the opportunity to visit COMAC's Pudong base, which is also the C919's production line. The C919 clearly represents the highest level of capability in China's current aircraft manufacturing.

However, during the visit to the COMAC institute, what impressed me the most was not the sleek production line of the C919, nor the mature production capacity of the ARJ21, but an aging, worn-out aircraft.

An Elder

On the road to the east of the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) Institute, a plane sits quietly, completely unremarkable to passersby. Its appearance is so ordinary that its engines look like mere models and ballast, evoking no desire to inspect it at all. In front of the aircraft stands a statue that is anything but imposing: it is neither a figure of a famous historical leader nor an aesthetically pleasing model, but rather humbly stands there to convey a single message: Do not give up.

At first, I assumed this uninteresting object was merely a teaching model, placed here for pedestrians to glance at. I thought there was nothing worth seeing, and that it would be better to visit the nearby Boeing 737 instead.

It was only after speaking with the senior experts at the COMAC Institute that I realized everyone holds this aircraft in high regard. Through our conversation, I learned that it is far from an old, ordinary plane. In fact, it represents the pinnacle of Chinese aircraft manufacturing capability in its time, serving as a source of inspiration that motivated countless people to persevere. It is, in essence, a museum. This museum records the story of a young person who lived in unfortunate times.

But to begin telling this person’s story, we must go back sixty years...

Sixty Years Ago

In its early stages, China's aviation industry relied heavily on the introduction of Soviet fighter jets and supporting equipment to achieve rapid development. However, during the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to adopt a new strategy, leading the Soviet Union to apply various economic pressures on China. This effectively closed the door to obtaining aviation technology from the Soviet Union. From then on, China had no choice but to independently develop military and civilian aircraft. Later, as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated and Sino-US relations improved, the United States began to ease its embargo on military technology exports to China. This provided the Chinese aviation and technology sectors with a new opportunity to access, understand, and learn from advanced Western technologies.

In 1968, after the successful test flight of the Chinese H-6 bomber, Premier Zhou Enlai proposed the design of a jet airliner. Chairman Mao Zedong, after inspecting Shanghai, further emphasized that Shanghai must undertake aircraft manufacturing. In August 1970, the Third Ministry of Machine Building began drafting a plan to develop a passenger aircraft based on the H-6. The final design principles were established as follows: a capacity of approximately 100 passengers, equipped with 3 or 4 engines, a range of 5,000 kilometers, a cruising altitude of 10,000 meters, a speed of 1,000 kilometers per hour, and all-weather operational capability. On August 21, 1970, the State Planning Commission and the National Defense Industry Leading Group of the Central Military Commission approved the "Report on the Trial Production of Transport Aircraft in Shanghai" submitted by the Aviation Industry Leading Group. The project was designated as "Project 708," and the aircraft was given the code name "Y-10."

On December 19, 1971, a Pakistani Boeing 707 aircraft was damaged upon landing in Xinjiang. On January 13, 1972, Marshal Ye Jianying issued instructions to immediately analyze the wreckage. Xiong Yan, the head of the Shanghai Project 708 design team, promptly led a team to Xinjiang. The entire process lasted over three months, involving approximately 500 people from 32 different units. Through the analysis and study of this wreckage, a basic understanding of the key data of the Boeing 707 was gained.

In retrospect, although the design of the Y-10 in the late 1960s was essentially a copy of the Boeing 707, it was indeed the most advanced and popular solution available at the time. It is worth noting that Airbus was not established until 1970. Even considering that it was an imitation, given the state of China's aircraft manufacturing industry at that time, its start was by no means late.

The Journey Begins at the Peak

The development process of the Y-10 aircraft can be summarized in the following stages: In June 1973, the State Council and the Central Military Commission jointly issued a document clarifying that the research and development of large passenger aircraft would be under the unified leadership of Shanghai, which would also be responsible for organizational implementation, while the technical business would be under the unified leadership of the Third Ministry of Machine Building; From 1973 to 1975 was the production preparation stage, mainly focusing on process reviews and experimental research into new processes, new standards, and new technologies; From 1975 to 1979 was the manufacturing and assembly stage, during which full-scale manufacturing, assembly, joining, and final assembly and debugging of the aircraft were carried out; On September 26, 1980, the Y-10 successfully completed its first test flight, followed by developmental test flights and cross-country test flights, visiting major domestic cities including Beijing, Harbin, Urumqi, Zhengzhou, Hefei, Guangzhou, Kunming, Chengdu, and Lhasa.--Y-10

Regarding the material above, as I read it, what comes to mind is still: In that era, it took less than seven years to develop an aircraft, which was truly efficient! Today, it is difficult to read the weight of history from such materials. We only know that this aircraft once participated in test flights in various parts of the country, leaving a striking presence.

According to Professor Cheng Bushi, the chief designer of the Y-10, during an interview with CCTV, the most spectacular and exciting test flight of the Y-10 aircraft was the route from Chengdu to Lhasa. The Y-10 aircraft gracefully navigated through numerous high peaks, achieving a true leap. This route's leap underwent various tests, including empty loads, full loads, and severe weather conditions. From empty flights to later transporting large amounts of supplies and relief goods to Tibet, the Y-10 was able to complete the tasks. When landing at Lhasa Gonggar Airport, PLA soldiers would salute this independently domestically produced aircraft.

Although the Y-10 still had a gap compared to the Boeing 707, its performance surpassed many Soviet aircraft operating in the Chinese civil aviation market at the time. In its research and development, the Y-10 broke through the specifications of Soviet aircraft and adopted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness regulations, thereby aligning with advanced levels in technical standards. The aircraft development process also widely used new processes, standards, and materials. The localization rate exceeded 96%.

Bizarre Death

Only two Y-10 aircraft were ever produced. The first was used for static testing, while the second underwent extensive flight testing. Parts for the third aircraft were only half-manufactured before the project was effectively abandoned. This stands in stark contrast to its outstanding performance: it was clearly the highest-level aircraft in the country at the time, with quite impressive data. So why was it not mass-produced?

Some official documents suggest the following:

After the expert review meeting, the Shanghai Municipal Government and the Third Ministry of Machine Building reported the situation of the meeting to Vice Premier Bo Yibo of the State Council and the State Council on August 13, 1981. The report recommended that the Y-10 aircraft complete the entire development process, achieve complete technical results, and proposed four options: developing three additional aircraft, two additional aircraft, one additional aircraft, or conducting necessary fatigue tests on the components already manufactured for the third aircraft. After this report was submitted, no approval was received. In early 1982, the Shanghai Planning Commission and the Municipal National Defense Industry Office reported again to the State Planning Commission, requesting an immediate response and the continuation of the development work for the third aircraft. They stated that Shanghai could bear half of the development costs (approximately 11 million yuan), but again, no approval was granted. As a result, apart from the second aircraft continuing limited flight testing (until it was grounded in February 1985), the Y-10 development work was essentially halted. --Y-10

It appears that the official documents do not provide a particularly clear reason. We know that the development and production of this aircraft seemed to stop abruptly and inexplicably.

However, the story does not seem to be that simple. The most direct cause appears to have been the entry of McDonnell Douglas.

At that time, Sino-US relations were in their honeymoon period. McDonnell Douglas proposed a willingness to jointly develop an advanced regional airliner with China and expressed readiness to directly sell the patent project for the DC-9/10 passenger aircraft to jointly develop the international market.

Moreover, the Y-10 faced numerous constraints during its design and manufacturing processes due to China’s then-lagging foundational conditions. Aircraft manufacturing is an incredibly complex major engineering effort, requiring the coordinated development of hundreds of small systems and disciplines. The development of numerous unfamiliar new products and components was undoubtedly very difficult for China’s aviation and electronics industries at the time. Given the advanced technology of the MD series and the predicament of the Y-10, abandoning the Y-10 large aircraft project became the most attractive option.

Clearly, the cooperation with McDonnell Douglas was not the only reason for the demise of the Y-10.

On August 13, 1981, the Shanghai Municipal Government and the Third Ministry of Machine Building reported to Vice Premier Bo Yibo and the State Council on the status of the feasibility demonstration meeting. The report recommended that the Y-10 aircraft complete the entire development process to achieve comprehensive technical results, and proposed four options: developing three additional aircraft, two additional aircraft, one additional aircraft, and conducting necessary fatigue tests on components already manufactured for the third aircraft. After this report was submitted, no approval was received. In early 1982, the Shanghai Municipal Planning Commission and the Municipal National Defense Industry Office reported to the State Planning Commission, requesting an immediate response and the continuation of the development work for the third aircraft. They indicated that Shanghai could bear half of the development costs (approximately 11 million yuan), but no approval was granted. Consequently, aside from the second Y-10 aircraft continuing with limited test flights (until it was grounded in February 1985), the development work was largely suspended.

Based on the available materials, the ultimate demise of the Y-10 remains unclear; support for the project suddenly disappeared. Even though the Third Ministry of Machine Building in Shanghai and the Shanghai Municipal Government insisted on seeing the project through, they received no approval whatsoever.

Born in the Wrong Era

It was born in an era that happened to be the most unfavorable one for it.

The Y-10 aircraft was initiated for development in China under the political climate of the "Cultural Revolution," inevitably bearing the imprint of that era. This is how it came to be known as the "Wang Hongwen Project." Xiong Yan, the former director of the Flight Test Research Institute, recalled in his memoirs: "At the time, some people in Shanghai interfered arbitrarily with the aircraft's development, demanding that extensive testing be skipped; they only wanted it to fly to Beijing to report good news to the central government. They even complained that the progress on the mockup was too slow and demanded that a shell be handcrafted and fitted with engines for a test flight. After being resisted by the aircraft development team, they actually pinned political labels on the developers, accusing them of 'doubting the capabilities of Chinese workers.'" In reality, the Y-10 only entered a normal developmental trajectory after the end of the Cultural Revolution.

From a historical perspective, the Y-10 was originally a good aircraft and a promising project. The fundamental reasons for its failure lay in the strange passive-aggressive atmosphere during the R&D process, frequent policy changes, inter-departmental infighting, and the lack of experience among the personnel.

When I tried to discuss these matters with the senior veterans who experienced the Y-10 era, they often told me:

In that era, computer-aided design was still far off. Engineers worked tirelessly day and night, drawing by hand with rulers, paper, and pens, sleeping only a few hours a day. The most absurd thing was that the state seemed to shift from initial support for the project to later hesitation, and eventually, funding was repeatedly delayed. The salaries of R&D personnel could not even keep up with the average in Shanghai. Yet all they cared about was getting the plane to fly; they would have risked their lives just to keep drawing. They didn't think about anything else—they just wanted to see the aircraft take to the skies.

The demise of the Y-10 is a pity. Whether it was the domestic passive-aggressiveness, the temptation of mature foreign aircraft, or the misguided decision that "buying is better than making," the causes of its failure were never singular.

In my view, this is not its fault. The Y-10 started almost simultaneously with Airbus. Had the resolve been firm and the team united, China's aircraft manufacturing capabilities would long ago have rivaled those of Airbus. Yet what awaited its fate was forced cancellation. China's aircraft manufacturing industry, which started at the same time as Airbus, has since struggled to make headway.

Museum

The only remaining Y-10 aircraft, tail number B-0002, has been preserved since its retirement. It was initially stored on the lawn of the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) at Shanghai Dachang Airport. Later, after minor repairs alongside an MD-80 passenger aircraft—also authorized for trial production by COMAC—it became a static exhibit in the same facility in April 2009. In December 2017, the Y-10 was disassembled into several sections and transported by flatbed truck to the lawn in front of the administrative building at COMAC’s Pudong facility, where it was reassembled. By mid-2018, it was displayed there in its original form as China’s first passenger aircraft.

Fortunately: when I visited this aircraft, it was still in remarkably good condition. The control yoke and throttle in the cockpit still looked like those of a new plane, bearing no sign of being a 50-year-old museum piece.

This humble aircraft, lying quietly here, represents the hardships, tears, and struggles of several generations. Perhaps people of the new era cannot fully comprehend this, but the story behind it is too heavy, serving as a constant reminder to future generations. Its failure, in the end, was due to losing its own spirit. The sign in front of it is a lesson learned from blood and tears: Never give up.

Never Stopped

The plane is not at fault; it was simply born into the wrong era, emerging at a moment riddled with sarcasm and an inability to unite. Its story was forced to end before it had even begun.

Yet the aviation community’s pursuit of large aircraft has never wavered. The subsequent termination of collaborations with McDonnell Douglas and Airbus served as a stark reminder to the Chinese people: there are no shortcuts in developing large aircraft; self-reliance is the only path. This is not about reinventing the wheel, but rather a profound reflection born from countless setbacks, decades of errors, and a missed opportunity to catch up with the times.

Over the past two decades, it is clear that we have been closing the gap—and doing so rapidly. Today, we have already achieved initial success.

People often ask me: Does the C919 actually have any market competitiveness?

It's hard for me to say, and I even feel it's not that significant. But, just as Intel also makes graphics cards. The manufacturing capability for large aircraft actually represents a nation's national defense strength and transportation capacity very well. Whether or not I am willing to choose a domestically produced plane at this moment, its appearance has certainly added more competition to the wide-body passenger aircraft market. This competition will obviously push all participants to more aggressively develop more advanced products. It's like, I might not be using Intel's graphics cards right now, but deep down I hope Intel's graphics cards become very strong to make the market more vibrant. Similarly, I deeply hope that the future of the C919 will allow it to compete on equal footing with the ABCs.

The pinnacle of the Y-10 was also the peak of China's aircraft manufacturing capability. I believe we have only just broken through that barrier.

References

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